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FORTHCOMING IN POLITIQUE AFRICAINE N° 120, DECEMBER 2010 
 
Jana Hönke 
New political topographies. Mining companies and indirect discharge in Southern 
Katanga (DRC) 
 
 
For analysing current reconfigurations of political order in Africa in a new way, this article 
suggests a focus on particular socio-economic spaces. It analyses how multinational 
companies govern security in the copper and cobalt mining region of Southern Katanga 
(DRC). The article argues that the extended role of companies in managing political order in 
Southern Katanga can be understood as a new form of indirect discharge by the host and the 
home states of multinational companies in such as way as to quasi-outsource local 
governance. It engenders political topographies different from those of corporate security 
governance in the XIX
th
-XX
th
 centuries. 
 
 
This article deals with the reconfiguration of political topographies in Africa
1
. Empirical 
statehood on the continent has only to a very limited extent been characterised by 
governments which exercise direct territorial control and other characteristics of the Weberian 
ideal-type ‘Anstaltsstaat’. Current arguments about a weakening or even a failure of the state 
are misleading as they are not always clear about this different starting point for contemporary 
reconfigurations of political order. To analyse current reconfigurations of political order in 
Africa in a new way, this article scales down the level of analysis from the central state to 
particular socio-economic spaces. Urban trading centres, rural zones of cash-crop production 
or enclaves of extraction provide meaningful units for comparative analysis of spatial 
reordering that is not centred a priori around the state. Such a perspective points to the flaws 
of statist approaches, whether they focus on the building or the failing of a territorial state. It 
also helps us to rethink what are old and what are new phenomena in what is described as a 
‘new’ post-Westphalian order and ‘new’ private governance in international relations. 
I apply such a perspective to the case of company security governance in an African 
extraction enclave: the copper and cobalt mining region of Southern Katanga in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Integrated in a transnational field of extraction, a 
plurality of actors make the mining areas a node of multiple governance interventions
2
. I trace 
how and where Western industrial mining companies have been involved in local ordering to 
secure extraction, and how this relates to governance by states. I argue firstly that local 
security governance by companies is not altogether new. I show how the colonial state in the 
now-DRC was built around pockets of “l’Afrique utile3” with the help of mining capital. 
However, the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion have shifted over time, as have the 
techniques and scope of companies’ security governance. Contrary to arguments that interpret 
                                                          
1. I thank Klaus Schlichte, Alexander Veit, Ulf Engel, Vincent Foucher, the participants of the panel 
Topographies of Rule at the European Conference of African Studies 2009 and in particular the four anonymous 
reviewers for Politique africaine for very helpful comments and suggestions. Final thanks to Nina Marshall, 
Barbara Kobler and Miriam Weihe for their research assistance and English corrections. An earlier draft of this 
article appeared as a Working Paper of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of 
Leipzig in 2009. 
2. The notion of nodes of governance is taken from criminologists L. Johnson and C. Shearing. See L. Johnston 
and C. Shearing, Governing Security. Explorations in Policing and Justice, New York, Routledge, 2003. 
3. C. Boone, “‘Empirical Statehood’ and Reconfiguration of Political Order”, in L. Villalón and P. Huxtable 
(eds.), The African State at a Critical Juncture, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 129–141. 
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the increasing role of private actors in contemporary governance as a sign of the weakening 
power of central state authorities, borrowing from Max Weber and Beatrice Hibou, I argue, 
secondly, that the extended role of corporate entities in security governance in Southern 
Katanga can be understood as a new form of indirect governance, a policy of ‘indirect 
discharge’ by the host and the home states of multinational companies (MNCs) which 
amounts to quasi-outsourcing of local governance to companies. Weber originally used this 
concept to describe a technique of rule in empires and feudal states, which works through the 
delegation of coercive and extractive authority from central rulers to local power holders
4
. I 
argue, thirdly, that this leads to historically distinct topographies of political order. 
I begin with a brief review of the literature on political topographies and on security 
governance in mining areas and outline my approach. I then turn to the copper and cobalt 
mining area in Southern Katanga, DRC. I trace different configurations for securing 
production and for discharging responsibility and control in the period from the arrival of 
Western companies in the 1890s to the establishment of colonial order by the 1920s, and the 
period of state reconstruction from 2003 to 2008
5
. I conclude by linking the case study 
findings back to the literature on political topographies and the state in Africa. 
 
 
‘New’ political topographies, extraction and security governance 
 
Among others, the historian Charles Maier traces the emergence and decline of modern 
territoriality. Territoriality refers to a historically-specific mode of organising social control in 
a “space with a border that allows effective control of public and political life6”. It is linked to 
the emergence of sovereignty – the linking of political authority or ‘decision space’ to an 
‘identity space’ within the bounded territory of states. Modern territoriality only became 
institutionalised as the dominant mode of political ordering in the era of the modern nation 
state (1870s-1960s). Although empirically sovereignty has conceivably varied between states 
during that period and after, as an idea upheld through mutual recognition
7
 state sovereignty 
has and continues to powerfully organise international and African politics
8
. 
While nowhere fully realised, in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America the limited 
territorial reach of the central state has combined since its colonial imposition with a 
multiplicity of parallel, overlapping, and sometimes competing, spatial orders and 
sovereignties. The literature on state practices highlights the non-territorial strategies 
governments use to consolidate the central state’s despotic power in such a context of 
multiple authorities and legal pluralism within a territory. The resulting “rhizomatic 
statehood
9”. is built on personalised, asymmetric networks, delegating the rule of sub-national 
                                                          
4. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie, Tübingen, Mohr, 1980, 
p. 580–623; see also B. Hibou, « De la privatisation des économies à la privatisation des États. Une analyse de la 
formation continue de l’État », in B. Hibou (ed.), La Privatisation des États, Paris, Karthala, 1999, p. 12–67. 
5. As my field research took place from 2006 to 2008 I do not discuss the effects of the economic recession after 
the recent financial crisis on companies’ security governance. 
6. C. Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality, 1600-2000”, in G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), 
Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, 
p. 34. 
7. J. T. Biersteker and C. Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construction, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 
8. C. Clapham, Africa in the International System, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; W. Reno, 
“How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States”, 
in T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local 
Networks of Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 197–215; P. Englebert, Africa: Unity, 
Sovereignty, and Sorrow, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009. 
9. J.-F. Bayart, L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre, Paris, Fayard, 1989. 
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territories to intermediaries
10
. Infrastructural power
11
 has only been selectively developed and 
de facto sovereignty is often shared through arrangements of indirect rule
12
. The detailed 
administrative control of bounded space, as in more governmental states in Europe, is 
replaced by a sporadic, preventive demonstration of despotic, coercive power for stabilising 
regimes
13
. Questions about a reconfiguration of territoriality on the continent need to be 
studied against this background. 
Since the end of the 1970s an “explosion of spaces14” has been observed. This observation 
was mainly written about for the Western world, indicating a transformation of the 
Westphalian, state-based order. While the permeability of national borders and the importance 
of the local and the transnational political spheres can hardly be denied, these observations 
have received different interpretations. It has been argued that states retreated or failed. 
Current reconfigurations are, however, better understood by thinking of them as processes of 
state transformation that are related to broader reconfigurations of spatial order
15
. 
The literature on the de-/re-territorialisation of political rule and economic production also 
underlines these interlinkages between local and global transformations. Saskia Sassen 
demonstrates how this leads to historically-specific political assemblages of different regimes 
of territoriality
16
. In economic geography, scholars have emphasised the archipélisation of 
production: clusters and enclaves of production are spread across the globe, increasingly 
detached from the economically ‘useless’ spaces in between17. Political geographer Neil 
Brenner argues that the related re-scaling of the political does not abolish nation states, but 
emphasises their regulatory role while increasingly reallocating rule to local and regional 
levels
18
. Work on the re-scaling of decision-making arenas points to the emergence of more 
localised governance. 
Since the 1980s, the literature on politics and the state in Africa has increasingly described the 
rise of networked, non-territorial rule. Privatisation and the retreat of the state from the 
economy, for instance, were promoted by international donors and financial institutions but, 
in contrast to their underlying neoliberal assumptions, these policies did not ‘free’ African 
markets from political interference. Instead they deprived governments of control of 
economic revenue, the redistribution of which had been used to bolster their control over local 
power centres. The neopatrimonial state’s networks of power and social control contracted 
and had to reorganise. The contracted personal networks of political elites – at the level of the 
central state as much as as that of different localities – reorganised control over 
                                                          
10. K. Schlichte, Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft. Politische Herrschaft in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika, 
Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2005, p. 115. 
11. M. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results”, European Archive 
of Sociology, vol. 25, 1984, p. 185–212. 
12. See for example C. Boone, Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and 
Institutional Choice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
13. J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2000; A. Mbembe “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in 
Africa”, in R. Beisinger and C. Young (eds.), Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia 
in Comparative Perspective, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2002, p. 53–80. 
14. H. Lefebvre, Les Contradictions de l’État moderne. La dialectique de l’État, Paris, UGE, 1978, p. 290. 
15. See for example S. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds.), Transformation of the State?, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005; R. Joseph, “The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa”, in 
R. Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 57–82. 
16. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
17. See for example W. Hein, Globalisierung und Differenzierung. Neue theoretische Ansätze zur 
Regionalentwicklung, University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, n° 47, Leipzig, 2001. 
18. N. Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization 
Studies”, Theory and Society, vol. 28, 1999, p. 39–78. 
4 
 
accumulation
19
. A new anthropology of politics in Africa describes multiple political 
authorities and non-state sovereignties and highlights their historical continuities
20
. ‘De facto 
sovereignty
21’ in many African spaces is not only pluralised, lying with different actors within 
the same territory, but has also been transnationalised. Besides the policies of colonial and 
external governments, multinational companies directly shape local governance. Development 
and security interventions expand liberal rationalities and technologies of governance into the 
postcolony
22
. The literature on the “respacing” of Africa23 is central to the main argument of 
this article. 
In it I investigate the reconfiguration of political order and the spatial nature of governance in 
industrial mining regions. Drawing on Catherine Boone and Charles Tilly, I assume a 
relationship between geographies of production and political topographies, and suggest that 
studying patterns and processes of spatial reordering in particular socio-economic spaces 
provides a new entry point into understanding hybrid forms of governance that crosscut the 
local, national and international sphere
24
. Mining areas are transnationalised business spaces 
in which local, transnational and international actors engender a hybrid regime of security 
governance. They are in fact “critical junctures of globalisation25” in which struggles over and 
changes in regimes of territorialisation can be observed. 
The governance of security by companies in Africa has so far been studied as part of research 
on the privatisation of global security governance
26
. Some studies have looked beyond private 
military security companies (PMSCs) and examined the security practices of corporations not 
specialised in security, such as those of the extractive industries
27
. Others have looked at 
companies as security actors in plural policing in Africa
28
, but do not look at the local policing 
practices of companies. Again others discuss enclave governance with regards to the oil 
industry, but at a general level
29
 or with a focus on the production of governable spaces 
                                                          
19. See for example C. Boone, “Africa’s New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open Economy in Côte 
d’Ivoire”, African Studies Review, vol. 50, n° 1, 2007, p. 59–81; C. Clapham, Africa…, op. cit.; B. Hibou, “De la 
privatisation…”, art. cit. 
20. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat, “Sovereignty Revisited”, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 35, 2006, 
p. 295–315; A. Gupta and J. Ferguson, Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997; J. Roitman, “New Sovereigns? Regulatory Authority in the Chad 
Basin”, in T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), Intervention…, op. cit., p. 240–263. 
21. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds.), Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in a Postcolonial 
World, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. 
22. T. Murray Li, The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics, Durham, 
Duke University Press, 2007; J. Bachmann and J. Hönke, “‘Peace and Security’ as Counterterrorism? Old and 
New Liberal Interventions and their Social Effects in Kenya”, African Affairs, vol. 109, n° 434, 2010, p. 97–114. 
23. U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), Respacing Africa, Leiden, Brill, 2010; see also U. Engel and G. R. Olson, 
Authority, Sovereignty and Africa’s Changing Regimes of Territorialisation, Leipzig, Working Paper Series of 
the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig, n° 7, 2010. 
24. C. Boone, Political…, op. cit.; C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD990-1992, 
Cambridge, Blackwell, 1992. 
25. U. Engel and M. Middell, „Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes. 
Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung“, Comparativ, vol. 15, n° 6, 2005, p. 5–38. 
26. D. Avant, The Market for Force, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; R. Abrahamsen and 
M. C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics”, 
International Political Sociology, vol. 3, n° 1, 2009, p. 1–17. 
27. A. Zalik, “The Niger Delta: ‘Petro Violence’ and ‘Partnership Development’”, Review of African Political 
Economy, vol. 101, 2004, p. 401–424; J. G. Frynas, “Corporate and State Response to Anti-oil Protests in the 
Niger Delta”, African Affairs, vol. 100, n° 398, 2001, p. 27–54. 
28. B. Baker, Multi-Choice Policing in Africa, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstituet, 2008; A.-M. Singh, Policing 
and Crime Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Burlington, Ashgate, 2008. 
29. J. Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa”, 
American Anthropologist, vol. 107, n° 3, 2005, p. 377–382; R. Soares De Oliveira, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of 
Guinea, London/New York, Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 103–119. 
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through the construction of different communities
30
. None of the existing research focuses on 
shifts in the spatial geography of security governance nor on how companies’ security 
practices fundamentally change the topography of (state) rule across time. 
This article tries to fill this gap
31
. It starts with an history of this transnationalised mode of 
security governance: how, by whom and where has security been governed in the late XIX
th
 
and early XX
th 
centuries? How has this changed today? Instead of providing a rigorous 
definition of ‘security’ that seeks to nail down this fuzzy concept, security practices are 
understood in this article as what company personnel understand to be such
32
. Thus, 
development interventions as well as armed protection or law enforcement may all be part of 
security governance. 
 
 
Governing pockets of ‘l’Afrique utile’ in Katanga, 1890 to the 1920s 
 
From a spatial perspective, the DRC institutionalised is an “archipelago state33”. In the 
economic realm, it inherited an outward-oriented archipelago economy. Colonial governments 
and companies invested in islands of ‘useful’ cash crop production and mining enclaves that 
they connected to the global economy, with many ‘useless’ spaces lying in between. As 
opposed to the regimes of territoriality suggested by Charles Maier, direct private company 
governance played an important role in Southern Katanga for much longer than just the period 
prior to the mid-XIX
th
 century
34
. The copperbelt of Katanga was integrated into a globalising 
economy from the beginning of industrial mining in the XIX
th 
century, and foreign capital has 
shaped local politics and security governance ever since. 
Large-scale industrial mining was a driver for the introduction of more direct modes of 
controlling African territory. Emerging enclaves of mining not only required the mobilisation 
of international capital to build up industrial infrastructure, they also required the 
administration of the rural hinterland to provide access to labour and cheap food supplies
35
. 
Southern Katanga was violently brought under control by a public-private partnership: the 
Compagnie du Katanga (CdK) which received exclusive buying and selling rights from the 
Belgian king Leopold II, as well as unhindered control over Katanga to open up its copper and 
cobalt reserves
36
. After the local ruler was overthrown and local chiefs were co-opted, the 
area was put under joint business-state control
37
. The inextricably intertwined nature of 
Leopold’s colonial aspirations and company interests is nicely captured by the label ‘État 
                                                          
30. M. Watts, “Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria”, Geopolitics, 
vol. 9, n° 1, 2004, p. 50–80. 
31. The article builds upon J. Hönke, Liberal Discourse and Hybrid Practise in Transnational Security 
Governance: Companies in Congo and South Africa in the 19
th
 and 21
st
 Centuries, PhD dissertation, Freie 
Universität Berlin, 2010. See for a related, earlier argument J. Hönke, “Extractive Orders: Transnational Mining 
Companies in the Nineteenth and Twenty-first Centuries in the Central African Copperbelt”, in R. Southall and 
H. Melber (eds.), A New Scramble for Africa?, Durban, KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009, p. 274–298. 
32. M. Valverde, “Analyzing the Governance of Security: Jurisdiction and Scale”, Behemoth. A Journal on 
Civilisation, vol. 1, 2008, p. 3–15. 
33. D. Tull, The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo), 
Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs, 2005, p. 43. 
34. C. Maier, “Transformations...”, art. cit. 
35. B. Jewsiewicki, “Rural Society and the Belgian Colonial Economy”, in D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin 
(eds.), History of Central Africa. Vol. 2, New York, Longman, 1983, p. 98. 
36. Following an appeal by Leopold II, the Belgian private sector became the major partner in colonising 
Katanga. The CdK was created in 1891 following a request by the king to protect Katanga from being conquered 
by the British South Africa Company. 
37. R. Slade, King Leopold’s Congo, New York, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 134–135. 
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holding
38’. When the international critique of Leopold’s violent regime in the Congo 
Independent State peaked, the Belgian state took over authority, forming the colony of the 
Belgian Congo. 
In this territory, the Union minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), created in 1906 and largely 
owned by Belgian financial capital, developed into a ‘state within a state’39. In a determinate 
space, the UMHK and the colonial state together built pockets of territorial rule around the 
sites of industrial mining, including a network of urban commercial centres, ports and 
railways
40
. The UMHK set up labour camps that it fully governed. Conditions in these were 
extremely bad, as the company herded African labour that was needed for constructing the 
railway and the early mine infrastructure into them, replacing losses with others recruited by 
force
41
. The testimony of a ‘boss boy’ summarises the climate in which people worked: “The 
work here is hard. Moreover, the Europeans strike us with their hand and feet. […] The 
hospital treats diseases with forced labour
42”. What we see here is a coercive regime of 
territorial governance 
By the 1920s, the company began enlarging the compounds in order to invest simultaneously 
in labour reproduction and control. This introduced a new mode of power: sovereign coercion 
was complemented with disciplinary power, thereby increasing the depth of governance 
interventions
43
. In the spirit of such new technologies of power, described by Foucault for 
Europe
44
, colonial state and company governmental interventions intensified, aiming at the 
production of permanent wage labour
45
. The UMHK “sought to reach further under the 
workers’ caps while tying their hands more fastly to new pacesetting machinery46”, by 
combining control with paternal welfare provision in the cités minières: settlements 
exclusively for workers and their families. The company sought to change the habits and 
beliefs of people by introducing modern time management, Catholic obedience and schools – 
institutions that were at the heart of creating a modern, capitalist work ethos. 
This also changed who governed. In the new workers’ settlements, two authorities maintained 
a “totalitarian subculture47” in the mines and in the labour settlements in their direct vicinity: 
“the compound head, responsible for discipline maintenance, and the [Catholic] teacher-
preacher responsible for morals and learning
48”. The colonial Belgian state, through the CSK, 
                                                          
38. J.-L. Vellut, “Les bassins miniers de l’ancien Congo belge. Essai d’histoire économique et sociale (1900-
1960)”, Les cahiers du CEDAF, vol. 7, 1981, p. 1–70. 
39. J. Depelchin, From the Congo Free State to Zaire (1885-1974), Dakar, Codesria, 1992. The UMHK was 
jointly owned by the Comité spécial du Katanga (CSK), the Société générale de Belgique, the British 
Tanganyika Concession Limited and other minor shareholders. See I. Ilunkamba, “Propriété publique et 
conventions de gestion dans l’industrie du cuivre du Zaire”, Les Cahiers du CEDAF, vol. 4/5, 1984, p. 1–185. 
From 1900 the CSK, another public-private entity, took over the administration of Southern Katanga and also the 
entire Katanga province. The CSK received extended administrative powers, as compared to the CdK, but was 
no longer directly involved in mineral explorations. 
40. J.-L. Vellut, “Mining in the Belgian Congo”, in D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin (eds.), History of Central 
Africa. Vol. 2, London, Longman, 1983, p. 146. 
41. B. Fetter, The Creation of Elizabethville, 1910-1940, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1976, p. 35. 
42. J.-L. Vellut, collection, card n° 1418: S. Claessens, “Inspection de l’industrie n° 152. État sanitaire de 
Likasi”, 14 octobre 1918, Kambove, cit. in J. Higginson, A Working Class in the Making: Belgian Colonial 
Labor Policy, Private Enterprise, and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951, Madison, University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1989, p. 36–37. 
43. J.-P. Peemans, Le Congo-Zaïre au gré du XX
e
 siècle. État, économie, société, 1880-1990, Paris, L’Harmattan, 
1997, p. 37. 
44. M. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société. Cours au Collège de France (1975-1976), Paris, Gallimard, 1976. 
45. J. Higginson, “Disputing the Machines: Scientific Management and the Transformation of the Work Routine 
at the Union minière du Haut-Katanga, 1918-1930”, African Economic History, vol. 17, 1988, p. 1–21. 
46. Ibid., p. 2. 
47. B. Fetter, L’Union minière du Haut-Katanga, 1920-1940. La naissance d’une sous-culture totalitaire, 
Bruxelles, Centre d’études et de documentation africaines, 1973. 
48. J.-L. Vellut, “Mining…”, art. cit., p. 156. 
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provided the security apparatus to enforce the new order and acted as a tax collector and as a 
punishing agent of last resort. What began to emerge by the 1920s, was a form of semi-private 
disciplinary governance in a rather coercive and particularly exclusive – colonial – form49. 
This brief analysis of company security governance in Katanga shows that, firstly, mining 
capital worked very closely with the state. Public-private co-governance is thus nothing new. 
The relationship here, however, is one of direct delegation of authority, initially by an external 
home state and then by the Belgian colonial government to the UMHK. Leopold II and later 
on the Belgian government, also held shares in the UMHK, alongside private investors such 
as the Société générale and others. Secondly, we find a territorial mode of governing business 
spaces which does not, however, translate into the effective administration of colonial state 
territory. There is an extended bubble of company rule governing the production site, as well 
as the adjacent settlements of workers and their families, which is backed-up by the coercive 
capacities of the colonial state. The labour settlements remained, however, geographically 
separated from the African quarters of the growing mining towns that were not controlled by 
the company, and its management sought to “prevent bad influence” on the behaviour of 
workers by keeping them segregated from ordinary African townships
50
. The idea was to 
isolate the bubble of social order produced by industrial production and a particular regulatory 
regime of discipline and control from a social environment represented by Europeans as 
‘hostile’ and ‘disorderly’. 
 
 
Corporate risk management, protection belts, and indirect discharge in Katanga, 2005-
2008 
 
What Maier calls the beginning of a post-territorial regime, and Lefebvre refers to as an 
‘explosion of spaces’, can also be found in the DRC from the late 1970s onwards. Yet here it 
took place under extremely different preconditions and with different dynamics than in the 
consolidated core of capitalist states. After the early authoritarian regime of Mobutu, its 
decline since the mid-1970s
51
, and the collapse of the Congolese state and formal mining 
industry during the Congolese wars from 1996 to 2003
52
, we currently observe attempts at 
(re)building a Congolese state and a formal mining economy. In the following I examine the 
topographies of governance in the context of the re-emerging industrial mining economy in 
Southern Katanga from 2005 to 2008, focusing on large, listed companies operating on the 
formal international market
53
. Foreign investment began pouring into Katanga’s mining 
                                                          
49. Compare similar findings by S. I. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi’s Urban Governmentalities, Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007, and T. Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, Los Angeles, California University Press, 1991. 
50. D. Dibwe dia Mwembu and G. Kalaba Mutabusha, « Lubumbashi. Des lieux et des personnes », in D. de 
Lame and D. Dibwe dia Mwembu (eds.), Tout passe. Instantanés populaires et traces du passé à Lubumbashi, 
Tervuren, Musée royal de l’Afrique centrale, 2005, p. 62. 
51. C. Young and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 
1985. 
52. M. W. Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo”, African Affairs, vol. 100, n° 400, 2001, p. 469–490; B. Rubbers, “L’effondrement de la Générale 
des carrières et des mines. Chronique d’un processus de privatisation informelle”, Cahiers d’études africaines, 
vol. 46, n° 181, 2006, p. 115–133. 
53. This section builds on field research in Southern Katanga in 2007 and 2008. Interviews were conducted with: 
academics, international NGOs, consultants and lawyers working on the DRC, on mining, and on Katanga; 
project managers of NGOs; representatives of international organisations, donor organisations, government, and 
in particular the security sector (the local and provincial branches of the Police nationale congolaise  – PNC –, 
and the Police des mines et hydrocarbures – PMH); and operation, security and community managers of the 
largest foreign-listed industrial mining companies in Southern Katanga, namely Tenke Fungurume 
Mining/Freeport MacMoRan, Anvil Mining, Ruashi Mining/Metorex Group, First Quantum Minerals, and 
KOL/DCP. 
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economy from 2005, when stability increased and preparations for presidential elections in 
2006 were underway. Even though the situation remained unstable and insecure, by then 
companies assessed that the external sovereignty of the DRC was sufficiently re-established 
with enough legal security provided for them to risk (re-)investing in Katanga. 
Adapting to the new domestic situation and to the international pressure to build an open, 
formal economy
54
, the government of Joseph Kabila developed a preference for foreign 
industrial investments relative to artisanal mining. This has been interpreted as an attempt to 
better control and (re)centralise the collection of mining revenues by government
55
. Larger 
industrial companies thus increase state income and are easier to control and tax. From the 
point of view of the government, foreign firms strengthen its position, since they are seen as 
effectively reviving copper and cobalt extraction without strengthening potential competing 
power centres
56
. 
With companies taking on a number of governance functions at the local level, I argue that the 
government’s policies can be understood as a new politics of indirect discharge. The recent 
literature on the politics of privatisation has reintroduced the governance technique of 
discharge. In reaction to the privatisation policies implemented since the 1980s, discharge has 
re-emerged as a means of consolidating the power of the central state through indirect 
governance, both through delegating state functions to non-state actors and indirectly ensuring 
control over the private sector
57
. 
The key point of this article is that discharge can work in very indirect ways and is not only 
used by companies’ host states. Instead of direct delegation, indirect mechanisms make 
companies take up governance functions: the discourse of corporate responsibility and private 
authority, and the (sometimes strategic) absence of the state from providing collective goods. 
It is a mechanism that is thus not only used by African governments. It is also employed by 
the international community and MNCs’ home states, who increasingly attribute authority to 
companies to engage in the governance of business spaces in ‘weak and failed states’. 
 
An omnipresent but absent state 
 
Concerning the role of the state in Katanga, state agents close to the current Kabila 
government control the provincial government and parts of the mining administration in order 
to exercise control over revenues, but are absent from the provision of social services and 
other collective goods. The state however exerts significant control as mining licenses can 
only be awarded by central government. The ways in which mining licences are awarded 
demonstrate the important role of powerful personal networks in government. In my own 
interviews, as well as in other studies, the involvement of senior politicians close to Joseph 
Kabila in mining contracts, but also in many ‘illegal’ mining and smuggling activities, is 
confirmed for the period after 2005
58
. One of the most notorious “political umbrellas59” is 
                                                          
54. See for example Banque mondiale, République démocratique du Congo. La bonne gouvernance dans le 
secteur minier comme facteur de croissance, rapport n° 43402-ZR, mai 2008. 
55. S. Van Hoyweghen, T. Trefon and S. Smis, “State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities”, Review 
of African Political Economy, vol. 29, n° 93-94, 2002, p. 381. 
56. See also P. Englebert, “Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a 
Weak State”, QEH Working Paper Series n° 95, Oxford Department of International Development, 2003, p. 28–
29. 
57. B. Hibou, « De la privatisation … », art. cit.; see also A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 2001. 
58. Global Witness, Digging in Corruption. Fraud, Abuse and Exploitation in Katanga’s Copper and Cobalt 
Mines, Washington, 2006, p. 42–44; Netherlands institute for Southern Africa and International Peace 
Information Service, The State versus the People. Governance, Mining and the Transitional Regime in the DRC, 
Amsterdam, NIZA, 2006, p. 40–43. 
59. Global Witness, Digging…, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Katumba Mwanke, co-founder of the ruling party Peoples Party for Reconstruction and 
Development and close advisor to the presidency. During the war, he brokered deals over key 
assets of state-owned mining companies Gécamines and Société minière de Bakwanga 
(Miba)
60
. While there are rumours about how companies acquired their contracts in general, in 
the specific case of Anvil Mining close relations behind the scenes with key political figures 
in Kinshasa are proven. Mwanke’s presence on the board of Anvil Mining for several years 
shows the close link between new investors and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo-Zaire war economy at that time
61
. The United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts named 
Mwanke a key player in the plunder of the DRC's resources, so Joseph Kabila removed him 
from the government commission during the peace negotiations
62
. However, he has 
subsequently held several positions in the two Kabila governments and was involved in the 
joint venture deals that sold the remaining Gécamines assets to private companies
63
. 
The Congolese state has been (re)produced since the official end of the war – at least as an 
idea – by international state-building efforts, by governing domestic elites and, last but not 
least, by large foreign investors concluding contracts over mining, oil and infrastructure 
investments
64
. Yet it is a small network of high-level politicians around Joseph Kabila in 
Kinshasa that has remained in control of access to the mineral resources of Southern Katanga 
from a distance, and who pursue private commercial interests. Access to these personal 
networks has remained an important precondition for doing business in Katanga today
65
. 
In the mining areas of Southern Katanga, state agents are omnipresent, but largely pursue 
private interests: members of the PNC, the PMH, the security agencies Agence nationale de 
renseignement and Direction générale des migrations, as well as of the Congolese army and 
the Presidential guard, all frequent mining sites, transport routes and border posts. The Kabila 
government also intervenes against critics of mining companies: the intimidation of local 
human rights groups working on artisanal mining as well as on multinational mining 
companies in Katanga has increased
66
. The state is, in contrast, largely absent or dysfunctional 
when it comes to solving conflicts and providing collective security and social services
67
. It 
relies on the companies, amongst others, to fulfil state functions – at least those usually 
associated with the state in liberal state theories – and to finance state institutions. 
 
Bubbles of company governance I: Managing conflict over resources 
 
Whilst in this sense the state is omnipresent in the background, in terms of performing other 
                                                          
60. Lutundula Commission Report, Rapport des travaux. 1
e
 partie, Commission spéciale chargée de l’examen de 
la validité des conventions à caractère économique et financier conclues pendant les guerres de 1996-97 et de 
1998, Kinshasa, 2005. 
61. Broadcast of “The Kilwa Incident”, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6 June 2005, 
including an interview with Bill Turner, CEO of Anvil Mining. 
62. UN, Report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo, New York, 2002. 
63. Barry Sergeant, “Mining D-Day in the Congo”, Mineweb, 3 April 2007, available at <mineweb.net>. 
64. P. Englebert, “Why…”, art. cit. 
65. Interviews with representatives of Anvil Mining, FQML, Ruashi Mining (Metorex), and observers of the 
political economy of extraction in Katanga, November 2007 and October-November 2008, Lubumbashi, 
Kinshasa, Ndola and Johannesburg. 
66. The president of the local NGO Ashado was arrested in July this year, for instance: interviews with local 
NGOs, October and November 2008, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi); J.-P. Nkutu, “Congo-Kinshasa – Affaire 
Golden Misabiko. Des activistes des droits humains dénoncent la politisation”, Le Phare, 10 August 2009. 
During my fieldwork in 2008, for instance, the passports of a Norwegian TV team and a South African journalist 
were taken away and I got stuck for days as a research permit was refused for visiting mining sites. 
67. See T. Trefon, Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa. Réponses populaires à la faillite de l’État, Tervuren/Paris, 
Institut africain/L’Harmattan, 2004; T. Trefon, Parcours administratifs dans un État en faillite. Récits populaires 
de Lubumbashi (RDC), Paris/Brussels, L’Harmattan/Musée royal d’Afrique centrale, 2007. 
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state functions, it is absent from the provision of collective goods. Mining companies in 
Southern Katanga hence provide their own security, drawing on the services of private 
security agents. A small in-house security department and a contracted private security 
provider are, however, also complemented with – equally contracted – state police. In such 
extended private company governance, the state thus still plays an important role. Yet it is a 
somewhat different one than in the past. 
How companies take up governance functions in Southern Katanga can be illustrated, firstly, 
by showing how the new investors initially occupied the land which they had acquired 
exclusive mining rights for and how they have been defending it against competing interests 
since
68
. When, by 2005, large industrial mining companies arrived in Lubumbashi, Likasi and 
Kolwezi to occupy these mining concessions, or started actually producing, conflicts over 
access to the minerals erupted at the local level between small-scale, ‘illegal’ miners and their 
protectors on the one hand, and newly established ‘legal’ industrial mining companies with 
government contracts on the other. The new investors organised the occupation and defence 
of the concessions, where necessary against local communities and artisanal miners, while the 
government provided the legal status and police in return for payment. In contrast to company 
governance in the XIX
th
 and early XX
th
 centuries, no authority for governing local security has 
been delegated to them by the state. However, the intentional laisser-faire policy of Kinshasa 
has put firms in a position to manage security in and around their concessions. 
A serious conflict developed between industrial and artisanal miners in Southern Katanga 
from 2005 onwards. Interviewees spoke of a “guerre civile sociale” during 2005-7 that 
rapidly developed into a regional problem, in particular in the mining town of Kolwezi in the 
north-east of the regional capital Lubumbashi. Riots escalated and the police called in by the 
companies, intervened violently
69
. The conflict in particular concerned the old open pit mines 
of Gécamines. Since the mid-1990s, deindustrialisation and the rise of a survivalist economy 
of artisanal extraction had gone hand in hand. Several tens of thousands of people have lived 
from artisanal mining in Katanga since then. In Kolwezi, it is 80 to 90 per cent of the 
population, including nearly anybody working in the state administration and the security 
services
70
. Neither the population affected by the new investments, nor the artisanal miners 
working on most Gécamines mines, had been consulted, nor had their interests been taken 
into account in agreements between the government, Gécamines and private companies
71
. 
How have the industrial mining companies dealt with these challenges? Companies use 
private security services, contract consultants, and pay state police and the military to enforce 
their property rights. Ruashi Mining and Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM/Freeport), for 
instance, offered compensation to artisanal miners and transport to other mining sites. This 
incentive strategy proved short-sighted, as it contributed to the spill-over of the ‘artisanal 
problem’ to other mining sites. Some companies offered alternative employment, usually in 
two forms: companies either contracted NGOs to put artisanal miners in small business 
training programs and apprenticeships, or promised to recruit people for low-skilled jobs on 
the mines. In several cases these miners complained that such promises have not been kept. 
More generally, the employment alternatives are extremely limited in their reach, as tens of 
thousands of people lost their jobs. 
Smaller and less visible firms immediately opted for calling in the state security forces – and 
                                                          
68. The following is based on interviews in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi in 2008 as well as on G. Mthembu-Salter, 
Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC, Johannesburg, South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 2009. 
69. “Police clash with DR Congo Miners”, BBC News, 7 March 2008. 
70. Interview with NGO Pact Congo and with the police and Gécamines representatives in Kolwezi, 
November 2008. 
71. Interviews with the NGOs Ashado, ACIDH, SARW and other observers, 2007 and 2008, Lubumbashi and 
Kolwezi. 
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paying for them - to suppress protest by artisanal miners or to ‘clear’ their concession at 
certain points, even though in many cases they had tacitly allowed them to work on their 
concession in return for extorting illegal taxes
72
. All the major international investors turned 
to coercive enforcement at some point. TFM/Freeport, for instance, developed with the 
mining police a system of fixed and moving patrols to get the concession under control. The 
company bought the services of up to 150 mining police agents to combat artisanal mining. 
Mine police and private security forces patrolled the area constantly. TFM/Freeport 
simultaneously began to strictly control the ore entering and leaving the concession, so that 
artisanal miners lost their supply chain. There were violent clashes between the police and 
members of the army, who attacked police roadblocks to protect their business interests in the 
artisanal mining sector
73
. During these clashes, several artisanal miners who had sided with 
factions of the Congolese army were reported to have been killed
74
. All in all, most companies 
made use of the police’s rapid reaction forces75 and turned their operations into little 
fortresses to protect their concessions. 
From the perspective of liberal economic theories and economic institutionalism, one may ask 
if protecting property rights is not what private business actors and states do everywhere, and 
if this is not actually at the heart of the police’s mandate in the modern state76. Even from this 
view, however, it is still remarkable that this task is increasingly outsourced to private actors, 
in Africa and elsewhere
77
. Direct and indirect forms of discharging state functions to 
commercial actors abound beyond the DRC. In contexts such as in the DRC two problematic 
points need to be stressed in particular: first, how property rights have been enforced; and 
second, the lack of legitimacy of contract awarding practices in the first place. 
Concerning the first point on how security is governed, the descriptions above have illustrated 
that human rights abuses, violence and death go along with clearing concessions. While 
companies such as Freeport McMoRan and Anvil Mining show that they are now aware of 
these problems and of the potential complicity in such behaviour by commercial or state 
security agents, it remains difficult for companies to comply with principles requesting them 
to abstain from such practices
78
. There is an unavoidably close entanglement of firms with 
state security agents in extraction enclaves that are at the basis of reproducing the political 
regime. Part of it is that PMSCs are not allowed to carry arms in the DRC
79
. Therefore, the 
mining industry depends on state security forces for robust operations. Government in turn 
                                                          
72. Violence has been reportedly used against artisanal miners by the trading company Chemaf at Ruashi. 
Similar incidents are reported from illegal artisanal sites on concessions of George Forrest company (interview 
with local human rights group, October 2008, Lubumbashi). 
73. Interview with Commandant of the PMH, November 2008, Kolwezi; interview with social development and 
security managers, mining company, Lubumbashi and Fungurume, November 2008; see also R. Custers and 
S. Nordbrand, Risky Business. The Lundin Group’s Involvement in the Tenke Fungurume Mining Project in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Antwerp/Stockholm, International Peace Information Service/SwedWatch, 
2008, p. 36–37. 
74. “Accrochages entre éléments des FARDC et police des mines à Fungurume”, Radio Okapi, 27 
December 2005. 
75. Interviews with company general and security managers as well as with members of the mining police 
(PMH) and the national, territorial police (PNC) in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and at Fungurume, 2008. 
76. I owe this question to one of my anonymous reviewers. 
77. S. Gumedze, Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation, Pretoria, Institute for 
Security Studies, 2007; E. Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
78. T. A. Börzel and J. Hönke, “From Compliance to Practice: Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights in the DRC”, paper presented at the American Political Science Association’s 
Conference 2010, Washington, September 2010. 
79. M. de Goede, “Private and Public Security in post-War Democratic Republic of Congo”, in S. Gumedze 
(ed.), Private Security in Africa: Country Series, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2008, p. 35–68. 
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makes companies pay state security forces; companies pay premiums per person
80
. Public 
security forces thus sell protection to private clients similarly to PMSCs. In 2003, a formal 
partnership agreement between the Congolese police and the private security industry was 
reached that formalized joint (armed) operations between public and private security 
providers. The agreement made it easier for companies to include payments to the police in 
their formal budgets
81
. Companies thus contribute to a commercialisation of state institutions 
and support patrimonial networks within the state administration. 
Concerning the second point, there are serious problems with the legitimacy of the contracts 
between the MNCs and the government. These problems concern the legitimacy of the 
process leading to and the content of these contracts. Following the privatisation policy 
enacted by Kabila, with the support of the World Bank, since 2002,
 
transnational companies 
struck deals with power brokers within the Kabila government that provided them with 
favourable conditions. By 2006, Gécamines was bound by 160 joint venture contracts with 
private companies. Participation and even consultation with local people about these contracts 
did not take place
82
. The recent review of mining contracts by the government which NGOs 
and critics had demanded is so ridden by lack of transparency and with political interference 
that it has hardly improved the situation
83
. A redistribution to the province and local 
communities, of the resource wealth extracted by companies, does not take place. Taxes from 
mining go to Kinshasa but are not distributed back to the provinces. It also remains unclear 
whether and how much taxes companies actually pay
84
. Selectively enforcing property rights 
for industrial mining companies has aggravated local social tensions and asymmetries. 
 
Bubbles of company governance II: Selective management of social (dis)order in the 
‘community belt’ 
 
Government also indirectly discharges responsibility for social order in the communities 
living in or adjacent to business spaces, to mining companies. In recent years, companies have 
extended the scope of their social programs and security management beyond the fortress of 
the mine into adjacent areas. MNCs thus provide for operational security by developmental 
and more traditional policing practices beyond their narrow private production sites, yet in 
significantly different ways than in the early XX
th
 century. At the local level, the state 
indirectly discharges the management of local grievances and conflict to companies. 
Companies are the direct target of people’s grievances and expectations in Southern Katanga. 
In addition to the frequent violent confrontations with artisanal miners, there are other 
examples. In Kolwezi, for instance, inhabitants of the former mining town UZK held hostage 
a security manager from one of the new companies on whose concession the former labour 
quarters were located, in order to put pressure on the company and the mayor to repair the 
settlement’s water supply85. In addition, large internationally-listed firms are likely to be 
                                                          
80. Since 2006, companies have been officially paying about 200 US$ per person per month. 50% went to 
Kinshasa, and 50% to the police, of which again only a small amount eventually reached the individual 
policemen attached to a mine (arrêté interministériel, 13 June 2006; interview with company security managers, 
November 2008, Lubumbashi). The money goes into the private pockets of police officers rather than into a 
general budget for the institution. 
81. M. de Goede, “Private…”, art. cit. 
82. Interviews with local NGOs Ashado, ACIDH in Lubumbashi, October 2007 and November/December 2008, 
and South Africa Research Watch (SARW), October 2008, Johannesburg. 
83. “A Fair Share for Congo!”, DRC Mining Contract Review: Overview and State of Play. Update 4, 
April 2008, available at <fataltransactions.org>. 
84. Interviews with expert on decentralisation, UN Development Programme, October 2008, Lubumbashi; see 
also African Institute of Corporate Citizenship, Mining Royalties Study, unpublished draft, 2008. The 
decentralisation of tax revenues prescribed by the new Constitution would channel money back to mining 
communities and the provincial government, but has not been implemented (yet). 
85. Interview with company security manager, November 2008, Kolwezi. 
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criticised for human rights abuses in remote places
86
. In this context, a local company 
representative put it this way: “We cannot point to the government. We cannot wait for 
government to build up”87. 
External governments also indirectly discharge governance functions to companies. External 
governments and international organisations increasingly attribute authority to companies to 
govern in “zones of weak governance88”, such as in the DRC. Since the 1990s, and in 
particular since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, such zones, in particular in 
Africa, feature prominently in the Western (in)security discourse
89
. To address such 
unconventional risks that lie beyond, or result from the very weakness of, the state, home state 
governments and international organisations appeal to companies to contribute to governing 
such disorderly contexts. This can be seen, for instance, in the Voluntary Principles asking 
companies to teach host states about human rights
90
, or in efforts to make companies part of 
conflict prevention
91
. Where the resulting commitment of companies to transnational 
governance initiatives is not only on paper, this responsibilisation of companies has led to 
new forms of community engagement. 
In terms of topography, corporate governance interventions beyond the narrow mining sites 
concentrate on a permeable belt of communities around operations. The community relations 
manager of a larger firm describes how in the DRC companies had to take on more and more 
social functions
92
. James Ferguson argues that mining companies have now become more 
“oil-like93”, as production depends even less on local conditions and can now be cut off more 
easily from the social environment. Community conflicts around the oil platforms and 
pipelines in the swamps of the Niger Delta show that even off-shore industries cannot isolate 
themselves from the social and political environment in which they intervene. 
To address such social and political risks, private governance is being extended beyond the 
fortress of the mining site. Such broader governmental interventions serve a different rationale 
than in the past, the scope and mode of governing in these pockets of intensified private 
governance is different. In contrast to the comprehensive system of coercive discipline and 
welfare in the company compound system in the early XX
th
 century, companies no longer 
invest in the reproduction and formation of the labour force. This is reflected in the run-down 
state of the old workers’ settlements94 and the fact that the new investors have not shown any 
interest in rehabilitating them. The focus of current company security governance has become 
to pre-emptively govern security risks such as potential instability, physical threats and 
                                                          
86. In Katanga, Western NGOs such as Raid, Global Witness, Niza, and Ipis cooperate with local NGOs such as 
Ashado and ACIDH, and target the more visible companies with public campaigns in their home countries, e.g. 
on Kilwa incident Global Witness, Raid, ACIDH and Global Witness. See Global Witness, Raid and ACIDH, 
Kilwa Trial: A Denial of Justice. A Chronology: October 2004–July 2007, Washington, 2007; Global Witness, 
“Digging…”, art. cit. 
87. Interview with social development and security managers, mining companies, November 2008, Lubumbashi. 
88. Oganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational 
Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones, Paris, OECD, 2006. 
89. J. Bachmann and J. Hönke, “‘Peace…”, art. cit.; P. J. Burgess (ed.), Handbook of New Security Studies, 
London, Routledge, 2010. 
90. See <voluntaryprinciples.org>, in particular part two on company-host state interactions. The VPs are a non-
binding transnational voluntary standard for company security governance. They have been initiated by the US 
and UK governments; current participants are six governments, some of the leading oil and mining companies, 
and a number of international NGOs. See also T. A. Börzel and J. Hönke, “From Compliance…”, art. cit. 
91. A. Wenger and D. Möckli, Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector, Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
92. Interview with community and conflict manager of a mining company, October 2007, Johannesburg. 
93. J. Ferguson, “Governing Extraction. New Spatialisations of Order and Disorder in Neoliberal Africa”, in 
J. Ferguson, Global Shadows. Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, 
p. 24. 
94. D. Dibwe dia Mwembu, Bana Shaba abandonnés par leur père. Structures de l’autorité et histoire sociale de 
la famille ouvrière au Katanga, 1910-1997, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001. 
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reputational risks emanating from the communities next to the mines and those dislocated by 
industrial mining. Therefore companies target selected groups in the flexible space of ‘their 
mining communities’. Criminologists have termed this, more general, trend in policing 
‘actuarial risk management95’. It draws on prevention and surveillance, acts on risk profiles, 
and seeks to activate private citizens for security purposes. 
Such an understanding of security governance as advanced risk management has encouraged 
the integration of organisational units within companies that are responsible for security, 
social development and public relations. As ‘their communities’ are sometimes companies’ 
greatest risk, both to physical security and to reputation, engaging with communities 
complements traditional security management through deterrence and control
96
. Another 
manager describes how, through a dialogue with communities and through education, his 
company tries to make people accept the company as a “patrimoine de leur environnement97”. 
The idea is to make the poor village communities the company’s partners, socially 
sanctioning theft from the mine and denouncing intruders. 
For achieving these aims, development projects are strategically placed in communities in the 
immediate environment of mining operations. The result is a narrow geographical scope of 
company governance. Another company security manager explains why: “We are not 
interested in building roads way outside our theatre of operation which have no direct 
advantage to the mining operation
98”. Risk management also entails the creation of regular 
consultation channels with communities. In Katanga, the large companies have introduced 
liaison officers into selected settlements, and it is hoped that they will resolve potential 
conflicts, through communication or donations but also provide companies with intelligence 
so that they are better prepared for potential trouble
99
. 
Such ‘developmental’ interventions in the vicinity of mining operations have not only been 
privatised, but have also been transnationalised. In the community belt, a node of international 
NGOs, donor agencies and PMSCs and consultancy outfits work for companies to manage 
local order and development. Freeport, Anvil Mining and others increasingly contract NGOs, 
such as Pact or International Alert, and the growing number of consultancies that specialise in 
mining, community relations and/or security. To mitigate conflict, Freeport and Anvil Mining 
have contracted Pact Congo, a local branch of the US-based NGO Pact, to work with artisanal 
miners. Amongst others, it has created small business projects with them to create alternative 
income opportunities. Companies even create local NGOs and community based 
organisations themselves. In addition, donor organisations such as the US and British 
development departments (USAID and DFID), have made the extractive industries in Katanga 
a focus of their work in the DRC. USAID initially financed Pact to enter into partnership with 
the large mining companies to support them in managing social relations. At the height of the 
price boom on the copper and cobalt markets in 2008, the consultancy branch of Pact had 
grown at such a pace that the organisation was largely paid for by companies
100
. 
The above illustrates that the large mining companies in Southern Katanga are very much 
involved in governing in the space adjacent to their operations – imagined by them in spatial 
terms as a ‘community belt’. This belt is, at the same time, increasingly integrated into 
                                                          
95. P. O’Malley, “Risk and Responsibility”, in O. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political 
Reason, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 189–208. 
96. Interviews with development and security managers of a mining company, November 2008, Kolwezi. 
97. Interview with company social development manager, November 2008, Lubumbashi. 
98. Interview with ex-group security manager, October 2007, Ndola, Zambia; interview with general manager 
and social manager, November 2008, Lubumbashi. 
99. Interviews with several staff of Pact Congo (see <pactworld.org>) in November 2007 and 2008, 
Lubumbashi; interviews with security and community managers of TFM/Freeport, KOL/DCP, and Anvil 
Mining, 2007 and 2008, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi. 
100. Conversations with both country representatives of USAID and DfID, October and November 2008, 
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. 
15 
 
transnational political fields. With regards to the outcomes and effects of such community 
engagement, further research is needed on the effects on local politics and the structural 
limitations of the kind of participatory community governance described above. The new 
ways of engaging with communities put local political hierarchies in question and may thus 
negatively affect corporate security. It has been shown that democratic principles conflict with 
companies interest in stability
101
. Companies have also often proved to be conservative forces 
that eventually side with the powerful and those recognised as sovereign
102
. A security 
manager expressed it this way: “We are stuck with those who are in power. There is no time 
lamenting about it. You want that copper? Deal with it!
103”. Some mining companies in 
Katanga have co-opted local chiefs through putting them on the payroll of the company, for 
instance. These examples point to the historical continuity of indirect rule. 
 
 
I have suggested in this article a scaling down of the focus of analysis from the level of the 
state to particular socio-economic areas in order to comparatively investigate reconfigurations 
of political topographies in Africa. I have argued that macro-level changes in governance and 
political topographies in the international and transnational realm articulate differently in 
particular socio-economic contexts. This article has investigated the political topographies in 
a particular site – the local business spaces of multinational mining companies in Southern 
Katanga – representing a particularly transnationalised bubble of governance. I have argued 
that the increasing role of corporate entities in local security governance can be understood as 
a new form of a policy of indirect discharge by companies’ host and home states who draw on 
companies to perform state functions, such as enforcing mining rights and managing social 
order. What makes the ‘new’ topographies of governing security distinctive is not the 
pluralisation of actors as such
104
, but the new, much more indirect technologies of governance 
and the spatial order they produce. In the past, the Belgian king, and later on the Belgian 
government, directly delegated authority to companies in order to build colonial rule. Today 
the DRC government, as well as the companies’ home states and the international community 
indirectly discharge local security governance to the mining companies. There are however 
differences in how and where security is governed now and in the past. Previously companies 
sought to comprehensively transform identities and bodies through coercive and disciplinary 
power based on a territorial strategy of compound rule. In the contemporary model, 
companies protect private fortresses of production, but also reach out beyond the fortresses of 
the mine into the ‘community belt’ around it. As opposed to the territorial fix and disciplinary 
regime of governing labour described for the 1890s to 1920s, the topography of this new risk 
management regime is narrower with regard to territorial control but broader and more 
flexible in its geographical scope. 
The case study has shown that processes of re-spatialisation do take place, but that they are 
not necessarily at the expense of the state. In the case of industrial extraction, the transnational 
economic networks are closely entangled with the state, both in the countries in which they 
operate and with regard to their home states. Furthermore, the (semi-)private governance of 
business spaces is very limited and selective in its geographical, social and functional scope. 
What we see is, in John Agnew’s terms, a regime of territoriality in which the territorial state, 
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n° 1, 2009, p. 142–179. 
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local polities and transnational economic and social networks are intertwined. While different 
spatial orders have always coexisted
105
, shifts in how they are related are taking place. What 
emerges from the analysis of company governance in Katanga is that there is a change in the 
hierarchical relationship between different scales compared to the period after the Second 
World War and the post-independence period: governance by governments was less a norm 
states at least referred to as aspired goal before and during early colonialism, as well as it is 
less so today. The article has hopefully demonstrated that looking into the production, use and 
interaction between different territorialities – state-based, company-controlled, or local 
polities’ bounded spaces – and transnational economic networks, functional fields, or practice 
communities, provides an innovative lens for future research through which new local and 
global topographies of power and de facto sovereignty can be explored. 
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Résumé 
Nouvelles topographies politiques. Entreprises minières et décharges indirectes au Sud 
du Katanga (RDC) 
Cet article entend analyser les reconfigurations actuelles du système politique en Afrique en 
étudiant la manière dont les multinationales gèrent la sécurité dans les régions minières de 
cuivre et de cobalt au Sud du Katanga (République démocratique du Congo – RDC). Ce texte 
cherche à démontrer que l’extension du rôle des entreprises dans la gestion du système 
politique au Sud du Katanga peut être interprétée comme une nouvelle forme de décharge 
indirecte effectuée par le pays d’accueil et par le pays d’origine de l’entreprise multinationale, 
pour externaliser, en grande partie, la gouvernance locale. Cela suggère des topographies 
politiques qui diffèrent de celles de la gestion de la sécurité par les entreprises au XIX
e
 et 
XX
e 
siècles. 
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